Master of Tickets: Breaking Down Live Nation Entertainment

Live Nation Entertainment has more than likely played a part in some of your most unforgettable experiences – from crowded concerts to nail-biting sports events. Following the merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster 15 years ago, it has ensured that if something is happening live, the company is more than likely involved. An anti-competitive monopoly, or simply a well-run company that has managed to beat out its rivals? That'll be up to you to decide. Join us in the front row as we tell the story of the undisputed leader in live entertainment.

• The merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster: In 2010, the world's largest concert promoter joined forces with the leading ticketing platform, creating Live Nation Entertainment.

• Complex history: Before merging into Live Nation Entertainment, Ticketmaster and Live Nation each had storied histories defined by mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs.

• A decade of transformation: The internet reshaped the music industry, shifting artists' revenue streams from album sales to streaming, ultimately making live performances the primary income source.

• Live ecosystem: Live Nation's vertically integrated business covers every step of live entertainment. If it's happening live, it's likely part of its ecosystem.

• The DOJ lawsuit: Live Nation is currently under judicial review following an antitrust lawsuit filed against the company in May 2024.

The story of the modern Live Nation Entertainment began in 2010 following the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster. The two companies had each built strong businesses and established brands in different areas of the entertainment industry and combining these forces would naturally bring synergies – basically creating a live entertainment ecosystem.

Or with hindsight bias, you can call these synergies flywheel and directly quote the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their lawsuit from May 2024:

Whether you're of the opinion that Live Nation has created an incredible business with the deepest of moats, or that they are conducting anti-competitive behavior and should split its business in two – the story of how we got here is a fascinating read. And, we have to admit, its business model is rather impressive.

Visualizing the revenue increase before and after the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster.

Visualizing the revenue increase before and after the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster.

Before we get into the complexities of ticketing fees, venue operation, and the role of a promoter, we will go back a few decades to tell the stories of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and how their paths eventually crossed.

The idea of Ticketmaster came from a man called Albert Leffler. Working as a box office manager, Leffler experienced the shift from a manual box office to a digital box office. Ticketing evolved from manually storing and organizing physical tickets in racks to being fully computerized, allowing for digital management and easy on-demand printing. This saved time, reduced costs, and allowed data to be collected.

Leffler was left deeply impressed with the new software, which was the computerized ticketing system of Ticketron. The pioneering Ticketron was the clear leader in the nascent ticket industry – but Leffler thought that there was room for one more company.

Teaming up with programmer Peter Gadwa and computer system salesman Gordon Gunn III, Albert Leffler co-founded Ticketmaster in 1975. After debuting its system at an Electric Light Orchestra concert at the University of New Mexico growth accelerated and has frankly never stopped since. In a few years, Ticketmaster had expanded its operations to Canada, several European countries, and as far as Australia – growing from managing university concerts to handling large-scale events like NBA games.

To support the opportunities that were there for the taking, Ticketmaster eventually got access to additional capital from the Pritzker family, owner of the Hyatt Corporation. The new ownership brought new leadership, with Fred Rosen appointed CEO of Ticketmaster in 1982.

Rosen was a passionate businessman who fit perfectly into Ticketmasters ambitions to challenge leader Ticketron. Under his leadership, Ticketmaster transitioned from a computer firm that sold tickets to an entertainment company that sold tickets.

Beyond offering advanced computerized ticketing systems, Rosen introduced a revenue-sharing model that offered venues a portion of service fees. Additionally, by providing advances to venue owners and promoters, Ticketmaster simplified event marketing which boosted ticket sales. These strategies not only incentivized venues to partner with Ticketmaster but eventually led to long-term exclusive agreements.

In retrospect, Rosen essentially reinvented the ticketing industry during these years, with Ticketmaster's business model continuing to draw inspiration from the innovative strategies of its former CEO.

Reflecting on Ticketmaster's success and its competition with Ticketron, Rosen offered a blend of humility and confidence in a 1985 interview with the LA Times: “You don't get very many chances to find somebody asleep at the switch, and in this case we did. What I've done is not brain surgery – it's Business 101. It's just a business that has been ignored.”

Rosen's business and sales practices were further described by Los Angeles venue The Forum's negotiator, Louis Baumeister in 1985: “We were looking to streamline our ticketing and accounting procedures. There was a little reluctance on Ticketron's part to take that step. Ticketmaster was willing to experiment and do it. Rosen is a very energetic guy. When he tells you he's going to do something, he more than likely will get it done.”

At the time of Rosen's arrival in 1982, Ticketmaster generated revenue of roughly $1 million. Within just five years, Ticketmaster had increased its revenue to close to $400 million(!), surpassing its once-dominant rival, Ticketron. In just over a decade, Leffler's Ticketron-inspired idea had evolved into the master of tickets.

And if the eclipse in revenue wasn't enough, Ticketmaster acquired the struggling Ticketron for $11 million in 1991 – a definite testament to Rosen's aggressive leadership and the company's incredible expansion during the 1980s.

Ticketmaster showcasing its offering at a trade show in the late 1970s.

Ticketmaster showcasing its offering at a trade show in the late 1970s.

The 1990s brought continued growth and expansion for Ticketmaster. But much of the decade's headlines were dominated by two key themes: ownership changes and a protracted dispute with Pearl Jam (which we will get back to later). In terms of the former, the company underwent several transitions.

In 1993, Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen acquired 80% of Ticketmaster's shares as part of a strategy to invest in “future technology companies”. Allen's success and expertise in the internet space aligned with Ticketmaster's ambitions to expand its business. While Allen played a role in launching Ticketmaster's first online sales portal, his relationship with Fred Rosen was strained from the start.

In 1997, Ticketmaster and Rosen filed lawsuits against Microsoft over unauthorized deep-linking. This practice allowed Microsoft's Sidewalk City Guides to bypass Ticketmaster's advertising-heavy homepage, directing users straight to ticket-purchase pages – effectively sidestepping a significant revenue source for Ticketmaster.

Although Allen was no longer involved in Microsoft's day-to-day operations, he remained on its board of directors. Just weeks after the lawsuit, he sold his entire stake in Ticketmaster. It remains unclear whether the lawsuit directly prompted the decision, but the timing is certainly suggestive, possibly serving as the final straw in an already tense relationship.

The buyer of Allen's stake was Home Shopping Network (HSN) (now IAC), which just a year later, in 1998, bought the remaining shares of the company. These transactions valued Ticketmaster at approximately $700 million.

Following the acquisition, HSN merged Ticketmaster with a company called CitySearch and launched an IPO under the name Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch Inc (TMCS) in December 1998. The company's valuation instantly climbed to over $3 billion, fueled in large part by the market's enthusiasm for anything bearing the term “online” during the dot-com bubble.

It's important to note, however, that Ticketmaster truly was online. Previously, its business had revolved around ticketing through physical outlets or phone orders. During these transformative years, the shift to the internet reshaped ticketing, enabling Ticketmaster to significantly expand and leverage its operations. Business was promising and the market liked what it saw.

Although the valuation at the dot-com peak, in hindsight, appears somewhat inflated, Ticketmaster continued to build on the momentum it had gained under Fred Rosen’s leadership, solidifying its position as not only the U.S. but the world’s leading ticketing company.

After the burst of the IT bubble, the valuations of many “internet” companies, including TMCS, depreciated significantly. In 2003, IAC announced its plan to reacquire TMCS. Valued at approximately $800 million, the company was once again taken private.

Back with IAC, Ticketmaster thrived as the internet cemented its status as the leader of the global ticketing industry. Until this point, Ticketmaster had worked closely with the concert promotion giant Live Nation. However, in 2007, the partnership came to an abrupt end when Live Nation announced it would not renew their contract, set to expire at the end of 2008.

The fraught conclusion to their collaboration was outlined in a Ticketmaster employee memo signed by CEO Sean Moriarty and Chairman Terry Barnes: “Live Nation has been a valued client for a very long time and we believe we've taken every reasonable step possible to facilitate a renewal, but they seem intent on a direction for their business that leaves us no viable way to work together.”

Shortly, we will dig deeper into Live Nation's decision to end the partnership.

On the back of losing roughly 15% of its revenue with the departure of Live Nation, IAC opted to spin off Ticketmaster once again in an attempt to streamline its portfolio. By August 2008, Ticketmaster was operating as an independent entity.

Much like tickets for a sold-out event vanishing in minutes, Ticketmaster's days as a standalone entity were short-lived. Just six months later, its relationship with Live Nation was fully restored and taken to new heights with the announcement of a merger between the promoter and ticketer.

Although Live Nation's history doesn't stretch as far back as Ticketmaster's, it is similarly shaped by mergers and acquisitions.

For this half of the story, we begin in New York City, with a man named Robert F.X. Sillerman. The born and raised New Yorker built his career during the 1970s to 1990s by acquiring radio and TV stations. Starting with regional acquisitions, his business steadily grew over the decades to include stations nationwide. His company, SFX Broadcasting, owned 71 stations by 1997. It was acquired the same year by Sillerman's former business partner, Steven Hick, for $2.1 billion.

With the sale of the broadcasting unit, Sillerman could focus on two other companies that he had been running for a few years. One of these was Marquee Group, an acquirer of agencies that represented athletes and musicians, which incorporated the likes of Billy Joel and Metallica. The other one was the larger and even more aggressive acquirer, SFX Entertainment.

As well as operating agencies like Marquee, SFX Entertainment expanded its portfolio by acquiring venues and promoters. Following Sillerman's divestment of SFX Broadcasting, resources were funneled into SFX Entertainment, fueling an intense acquisition spree in the late 1990s.

By 1998, SFX Entertainment had achieved a commanding presence in athlete representation, acquiring agencies to the extent that it represented over 15% of all NBA and MLB players, including none other than Michael Jordan during the final years of his legendary Chicago Bulls career.

During this period, SFX didn't limit its ambitions to the U.S. market. The company began expanding internationally, establishing a presence in Europe. SFX was gaining a foothold in live entertainment globally with its promoting business flourishing.

What made Sillerman's strategy successful was his ability to secure sponsorship deals with prominent brands, targeting the audience at SFX-promoted shows. In a 1998 interview with The New York Times, he explained: “We want to make money both by selling tickets and by putting a live audience in front of Madison Avenue.”

However, the aggressive spree and vertical industry expansion was starting to meet opposition. In 1998, the DOJ launched an informal inquiry into SFX's market practices, investigating whether the company was monopolizing the concert promotion business. Among the vocal opponents to SFX's expansion was a highly influential and respectable figure named Barry Diller. Diller was the CEO of HSN, which as you might remember had just acquired Ticketmaster.

In hindsight, there is some great irony in that the CEO of Ticketmaster's parent company accuses SFX of monopolistic practices. Fast forward roughly one decade and the two merge, fast forward two and a half decades, and the merged entity is accused of anti-competitive behavior.

The DOJ probe of 1998 was dropped with no action. Shortly thereafter, Ticketmaster and SFX Entertainment became business partners, signing an agreement that granted Ticketmaster exclusive rights for all SFX events for several years.

In 1999, Sillerman's entertainment ventures were consolidated as SFX acquired the smaller Marquee Group. This acquisition finalized the creation of a giant force in live entertainment – promoting over 20,000 events annually, managing more than 120 venues, and representing over 650 professional athletes.

Robert Sillerman (right) and Rod Stewart (middle) during SFX's opening ceremony at the New York Stock Exchange in 1999.

Robert Sillerman (right) and Rod Stewart (middle) during SFX's opening ceremony at the New York Stock Exchange in 1999.

Sillerman's ambitious tenure with SFX Entertainment came to an end in 2000 when the company was acquired by radio station owner Clear Channel Communications (now iHeartMedia). As the nation's largest radio conglomerate, with ownership of over 800 stations, Clear Channel aimed to create synergies between its extensive radio network and SFX's live events.

Renamed Clear Channel Entertainment (CCE), the entertainment company expanded its event portfolio but struggled to achieve the financial success needed to satisfy ownership. With the anticipated synergies across the group failing to materialize, Clear Channel opted to divest CCE. In late 2005, the company was spun off as CCE Spinco, but soon rebranded as Live Nation.

As an independent entity, Live Nation began streamlining its business to focus exclusively on live music. This involved selling off assets in theatrical productions and sports while aggressively acquiring promoter and venue-related businesses. At the time, many anticipated that Live Nation was also positioning itself to challenge Ticketmaster in ticketing, aiming to control every facet of the live music economy.

However, Live Nation was still partnered with Ticketmaster. But, as described earlier, this was due to expire by the end of 2008. In a strategic move, the aggressively expanding Live Nation entered into a deal with German ticketing company CTS Eventim in 2007.

Under the agreement, CTS Eventim would handle all of Live Nation's ticketing operations in Europe, while Live Nation would license the German company's software to establish its own ticketing operations in the U.S. and other markets. Thereby, confirming that it would not renew its contract with its former partner, Ticketmaster.

Live Nation's empire-building seems impressive in hindsight, but its operations at the time faced significant challenges. An attempt to enter the record label business with all-encompassing artist deals proved to be a costly misstep. Additionally, CTS Eventim's ticketing system was not as robust as they hoped, having crashed during important concert sales. Perhaps, replacing the experienced Ticketmaster in ticketing was more difficult than expected.

In a twist reminiscent of a decade earlier, when Diller accused Live Nation of anti-competitive practices, the two companies went from estranged partners to unified forces. Just months after the contract expired in 2008, a merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster was announced.

In February 2009, the $2.5 billion merger was announced, bringing together two leaders from opposite sides of live entertainment. From the perspectives of both companies, the merger promised significant synergies and transformative potential – creating a live entertainment ecosystem.

After undergoing extensive regulatory procedures, the merger received approval in January 2010. The newly formed Live Nation Entertainment was structured so that shareholders from both Live Nation and Ticketmaster each held approximately 50% of the company.

A key condition of the merger's approval required Ticketmaster to provide competitor Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) access to its ticketing technology. By so, inviting AEG to fully compete with the new entity in both promoting and ticketing.

While the merger was promising for Live Nation Entertainment, many feared it would have negative competitive consequences. Merging the world's largest concert promoter and ticketing company created a behemoth with footholds across the entire live value chain.

Bruce Springsteen was among the vocal critics, writing on his website: “... the one thing that would make the current ticket situation even worse for the fan than it is now would be Ticketmaster and Live Nation coming up with a single system, thereby returning us to a near monopoly situation in music ticketing.”

The Boss may have had a point – just ask any Taylor Swift fan.

To fully grasp Live Nation's influential position in live, or actually, the broader music industry, we will once again go back in time a few decades, to when the business of music looked vastly different from today.

Rewind a few decades – or more precisely, exactly four – to 1984, when merger skeptic Bruce Springsteen released his iconic album Born in the U.S.A. This was an era when record labels sat at the top of the music industry's value chain. Record labels played a central role in financing album production, marketing, and distribution, claiming a significant share of the revenue from album sales. Before technological advancements completely transformed revenue streams, the real money was in selling LPs, cassettes, and later CDs.

Born in the U.S.A. achieved remarkable success, selling over 30 million records globally. Artists typically earned royalties – usually around 10% of the retail price of the album. Assuming an average retail price of $10 per, Springsteen's earnings from the album sales would be around $30 million, equivalent to about $90 million in 2024.

Although Springsteen's tour for the album was an exception (and reportedly grossed around $80-90 million), touring back then was primarily viewed as a promotional activity to boost album sales rather than the primary revenue source. The revenue from concerts often covered expenses, with limited profit margins, while record sales accounted for the bulk of an artist's income.

Then the internet came and the music industry had to turn and face the strange.

Over the course of a turbulent decade, everything changed – partially foreseen by David Bowie in 2002, as the transformation was just beginning: ''Music itself is going to become like running water or electricity, … You'd better be prepared for doing a lot of touring because that's really the only unique situation that's going to be left.”

This shift was sparked by the rise of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms like Napster, which enabled the free download of music files. Though controversial and illegal, its innovativeness inspired the next wave of web-driven file-sharing services, like Limewire and Kazaa, before legitimate streaming platforms such as YouTube, iTunes, and Spotify completely revolutionized the industry.

As album sales plummeted, the economics of music began to shift dramatically. Streaming companies emerged, taking on the record labels that had long held the industry’s throne. There is much to be covered and discussed about this particular battle, but that will be for another time.

To demonstrate the shifting power dynamics in the music industry, we will briefly expand on the economics of streaming (since it has largely replaced album sales as the primary way artists share their music with fans).

To exemplify, artists generally earn between $0.003 and $0.005 per stream on Spotify. However, this revenue is divided among various rights holders, including songwriters, producers, and record labels. As a result, artists usually receive only 10% to 50% of the total per-stream revenue.

Let's look at Taylor Swift's earnings to provide perspective on these numbers. In 2023, her 29.1 billion streams on Spotify set a record as the most ever in a single year – nearly double the combined total of Bad Bunny and The Weeknd, who ranked second and third. These streams generated an estimated $100 million in royalties for Swift, before dividing revenue among rights holders.

Swift's The Eras Tour (which we will explore in greater detail later) generated nearly $2 billion in ticket sales. According to Dan Wall, Executive Vice President at Live Nation Entertainment, top artists typically retain over 90% of the net ticket revenues. These earnings are then shared with their management, agents, production staff, and production crews, to name a few.

Although the tour stretched over two years, this figure compared to the royalties demonstrates the shift. Sure, she made great money from streaming. But, she made incredible money from touring.

Even though music has yet to become as ubiquitous as running water or electricity, Bowie was right about the unique significance of touring. If Swift's revenue breakdown isn't convincing enough, Michael Rapino, CEO of Live Nation, highlighted the broader industry shift in 2022: “Artists today make 95% of their income from live music events and Live Nation is now the ‘largest single financer’ of artists worldwide.”

With its services all over those 95%, the wind of change was certainly in Live Nation's sails.

Since the 2010 merger, Live Nation Entertainment's business has been structured around three key segments: Concerts, Ticketing, and Sponsorship & Advertising. The ticketing division stems from the former Ticketmaster, while Live Nation's promoter operations encompass the other two segments.

To best understand Live Nation Entertainment's business model, there's no better approach than to break down a concert from start to finish, examining each stage and how it aligns with the company's segments. For simplicity, we'll refer to the merged entity as Live Nation going forward.

The artist, often through their agents or managers, starts the process by choosing promoters. Live Nation's Concerts segment frequently gets involved at this stage, acting as the promoter, responsible for planning the concert. Live Nation helps the artist select a venue, determine the appropriate ticket price, promote the event, and bear the financial risk and reward of the event's performance.

While this segment generated over $19 billion in the last twelve months as of Q3 2024 (driven by the billions of dollars in ticket sales from the acts it promotes), its margin is just 3%.

Another important factor here is that, just like the old days when Sillerman was in charge, Live Nation still operates as an artist management company. As of 2023 (the last time they reported on this), Live Nation managed over 400 artists. Understandably, acting as the advisor of the artist, the choice of promoter is rather straightforward.

When selecting a venue, numerous factors come into play, including the artist’s style, expected audience size, and preferred location. Over the years, Live Nation has built an extensive network of venues with controlling interest in 373 venues globally as of 2023. Of these, approximately 10% are owned, 55% are leased, and the rest is evenly split between operated and exclusive booking rights. By 2024, Live Nation controls about 60% of major-venue concerts in the U.S.

Venue control plays a significant role in determining which artists can perform at a given location. With Live Nation involved on both sides of the tables in these decisions, lucrative arrangements can often encourage artists to choose Live Nation-controlled venues.

Additionally, many of these venues have long-term contracts with Ticketmaster, designating it as the exclusive ticketer – primarily due to the complexity of integrating a new ticketing system. Consequently, if an artist selects a venue operated by Live Nation, Ticketmaster is the ticketer.

This extensive network incentivizes Live Nation to steer artists toward its venues, as they capture the majority of revenue generated on-site (unless an external management company is hired to operate the venue). Revenue streams include not only venue rental fees but also fees from ticket sales, concessions, parking, security, artist merchandise, and supplementary stage and performance services.

Live Nation's venue operations typically have a relatively high margin. However, it is reported under the Concerts segment so the exact numbers are not public.

The next step in the process is the Ticketing segment, managed by Ticketmaster. In 2023, the company distributed a staggering 620 million tickets. Although undeniably impressive, ticketing is unquestionably the most criticized part of Live Nation's business, with many perceiving Ticketmaster as exploiting the public through hidden fees.

This stance is almost as old as the company itself. In 1994, Pearl Jam launched a high-profile campaign against Ticketmaster, criticizing the company's steep and unreasonable add-on fees (which on average amounted to over a quarter of the ticket prices). Determined to keep ticket prices affordable, Pearl Jam sought to bypass Ticketmaster by booking venues not tied to the company's exclusive contracts.

However, they quickly encountered a harsh reality: Ticketmaster's dominance meant most major venues were unavailable, forcing the band to deal with logistical hurdles, canceled shows, and eventual internal strain. Pearl Jam took their fight further by filing a formal complaint with the DOJ, highlighting Ticketmaster's opaque service fees as a core grievance. Despite the band's efforts, the DOJ closed the investigation without action, citing insufficient evidence of antitrust violations.

While Pearl Jam's case might have been reasonable to some extent, much has happened since and Live Nation is now more transparent with its fees.

Service charges, also known as add-on fees, for tickets today are primarily determined by venues, which as we know in many cases are controlled by Live Nation. These fees cover the operational costs of hosting events, such as staffing, maintenance, and ticketing technology. While Ticketmaster facilitates the ticketing process, the majority of this fee revenue goes to the venue, with only a portion retained by the ticketing company.

Of the service fee, roughly two-thirds accrues to the venue, while the ticketing company gets approximately one-fourth of the fee. On average, Ticketmaster's cut per ticket is close to 5% and the final profit per ticket is around 2% of the average ticket price.

Ticket prices themselves, excluding add-on fees, are set by the artists and their management teams. Ticketmaster merely provides the infrastructure for selling and distributing tickets, without influencing the face value determined by the artist.

Although, as noted, Live Nation's control over venues often allows it to benefit across multiple layers of the transaction. Without factoring in revenue from these additional streams, the Ticketing segment of Live Nation had a margin of 36% for the last twelve months as of Q3 2024.

Besides primary ticketing, Ticketmaster also offers secondary ticketing, allowing users to safely resell their tickets through its platform. The company generates revenue through fees charged to both buyers and sellers, with resale prices determined by supply and demand dynamics.

After finalizing the venue and ticketing strategies, promotion of the event begins. Promoters like Live Nation are responsible for advertising and marketing the concert to ensure a successful turnout. This includes creating campaigns across social media, digital platforms, and traditional media to generate excitement.

Additionally, this stage includes securing sponsorships and advertising from other businesses at the event. These activities fall under the Sponsorship & Advertising segment, which is the company's smallest segment in terms of revenue but highest in terms of margin – recording a whopping 68% LTM as of Q3 2024.

A financial overview of Live Nation Entertainment's three segments.

A financial overview of Live Nation Entertainment's three segments.

In summary, Live Nation's concert promotion segment drives revenue for its high-margin venue operations, ticketing, and sponsorship and advertising. This vertical integration of its business strengthens each segment and deepens the company's moat.

When all aspects of the concert are managed within Live Nation's ecosystem: the artist is represented by Live Nation, selects Live Nation as the promoter, chooses a venue controlled by Live Nation, uses Ticketmaster (owned by Live Nation) for ticketing, and benefits from sponsorships and advertising coordinated by Live Nation as both promoter and venue operator.

Live Nation's services, primarily Ticketmaster, are also widely used for entertainment beyond music. This includes sports events, theatrical performances, comedy shows, and more. In terms of sports events, Live Nation typically does not act as a promoter.

Instead, sports teams and organizations usually handle their own event promotions and management. Ticketmaster provides ticketing services for these events, facilitating the sale and distribution of tickets to fans. And in some cases, it controls the venue, allowing Live Nation to benefit from on-site revenue streams.

Picking up where Pearl Jam left off, artist Zach Bryan made a statement in 2022 with the release of his live album titled “All My Homies Hate Ticketmaster”. To further drive his point, he chose not to use the ticketing platform for his 2023 tour, aiming to keep ticket prices more affordable for fans. We will get back to this shortly…

Artists don't always use Live Nation's full suite of services. The most well-known example being Taylor Swift's The Eras Tour. The tour is set to be the highest-grossing tour of all time, reaching close to $2 billion, almost double the amount of Coldplay at second, and with fewer shows.

For The Eras Tour, Swift partnered with Live Nation's competitor AEG as the concert promoter. Despite AEG's role as the promoter and the fact that they have their own ticketing system in AXS, Ticketmaster managed a significant portion of the tour's ticket sales. This arrangement was not by AEG's choice; stating that, "Ticketmaster's exclusive deals with the vast majority of venues on the 'Eras' tour required us to ticket through their system."

Highlighting yet again that even when an artist selects a promoter outside of Live Nation's network, Ticketmaster's extensive venue agreements and Live Nation's ownership of key venues can make its involvement in ticketing unavoidable. More than two decades later, Taylor Swift found herself confronting the same harsh reality that Pearl Jam once faced – when the show must go on, Ticketmaster becomes the inevitable choice.

Additionally, on top of the ticketing services, Live Nation's control over many of the venues in the tour means that they generate revenue from various streams during the event.

When an artist of Swift's stature – known for standing her ground – must rely on a competitor's services to secure access to the largest venues, showcases the grip Live Nation has on live entertainment. While its vertical integration doesn't entitle it to a direct slice of The Eras Tour's $2 billion, Live Nation still carves out several smaller portions of the pie.

To further emphasize Live Nation's strong position, let's revisit Zach Bryan. In 2023, he announced that his next tour would use Ticketmaster's services with a statement: "All my homies still do hate Ticketmaster but hard to realize one guy can't change the whole system."

In 2022, the tumultuous ticket sales for Taylor Swift's The Eras Tour placed Ticketmaster and Live Nation at the center of the stage, under a glaring spotlight of scrutiny. Fans faced widespread technical issues using Ticketmaster that created a supply-constrained market, driving exorbitant resale prices and sparking public outcry.

These issues and Live Nation's unavoidable role in the tour reignited concerns over the company's status in the live music ecosystem and whether its merger should have been approved.

In May 2024, the DOJ, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Live Nation Entertainment. The suit alleges that the company has unlawfully monopolized the live events market through a self-reinforcing "flywheel" strategy. A term popularized by Amazon, illustrating how enhancing customer experience leads to increased traffic, attracting more sellers, expanding product selection, and ultimately creating a self-reinforcing cycle of growth and efficiency.

The DOJ claims Live Nation uses its concert promotion business – the core of its “flywheel” – to fuel its other high-margin operations, including Ticketmaster's ticketing services, its extensive venue network, and its sponsorship and advertising business. The approach allegedly stifles competition and harms consumers.

The DOJ's proposed remedy is a structural separation of Live Nation and Ticketmaster. This move is said to restore competitive balance in the industry and dismantle the integrated system that allegedly allows Live Nation to exert influence over artists, venues, and consumers.

Live Nation has strongly denied the DOJ's allegations, asserting that its integrated business model is not monopolistic but that its services benefit artists, venues, and fans. And that breaking up the company would disrupt the live entertainment ecosystem, potentially harming all stakeholders.

This lawsuit is part of a broader antitrust initiative by the Biden administration, which has pursued similar actions against tech giants like Amazon, Apple, and Google. The case against Live Nation is currently under judicial review, with its outcome to be determined by the courts. The company expects to begin engagement with the DOJ in early 2025.

However, the change in the political landscape with the election of Donald Trump could lead to a reevaluation of ongoing cases, including the one against Live Nation. Historically, the Trump administration has favored a more lenient approach to antitrust enforcement, emphasizing deregulation and business-friendly policies.

Who's to blame for the rise in ticket prices? The answer is blowin' in the wind.

Who's to blame for the rise in ticket prices? The answer is blowin' in the wind.

Nearly 15 years after the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, the reasoning behind their union is even more obvious than it was at the time. Bringing together the world's largest concert promoter with the leading ticketing platform has created a vertically integrated system that covers every step of live entertainment. With contracts spanning over 400 artists, ownership of 377 venues, and the distribution of more than 620 million tickets annually, Live Nation has ensured that if it's live, it's likely happening within its ecosystem.